In der 1970 gegr ndeten Reihe erscheinen Arbeiten, die philosophiehistorische Studien mit einem systematischen Ansatz oder systematische Studien mit philosophiehistorischen Rekonstruktionen verbinden. Neben deutschsprachigen werden auch englischsprachige Monographien ver ffentlicht. Gr ndungsherausgeber sind: Erhard Scheibe (Herausgeber bis 1991), G nther Patzig (bis 1999) und Wolfgang Wieland (bis 2003). Von 1990 bis 2007 wurde die Reihe von J rgen Mittelstra mitherausgegeben.

Introducing his paper, Slezak (p. 428) proposes “to examine Botha's criticisms in detail with a view to demonstrating that they are without foundation and are based on the most fundamental misunderstandings”. Concluding his paper, Slezak (p. 439) expresses the hope that he has shown “that the conceptions on which these criticisms rest are so seriously flawed as to make it unprofitable to attempt to unravel the rest of his analysis”. These formulations, by all standards, represent rather strong rhetoric. But, as (...) the preceding paragraphs have shown, Slezak's discussion sadly lacks the relevant and accurate analyses needed to give substance to his rhetoric. (shrink)

Moral behaviour, based on social norms, is commonly regarded as a hallmark of humans. Hitherto, humans are perceived to be the only species possessing social norms and to engage in moral behaviour. There is anecdotal evidence suggesting their presence in chimpanzees, but systematic studies are lacking. Here, we examine the evolution of human social norms and their underlying psychological mechanisms. For this, we distinguish between conventions, cultural social norms and universal social norms. We aim at exploring whether chimpanzees possess evolutionary (...) precursors of universal social norms seen in humans. Chimpanzees exhibit important preconditions for their presence and enforcement: tolerant societies, well-developed social-cognitive skills and empathetic competence. Here, we develop a theoretical framework for recognizing different functional levels of social norms and distinguish them from mere statistical behavioural regularities. Quasi social norms are found where animals behave functionally moral without having moral emotions. In proto social norms, moral emotions might be present but cannot be collectivized due to the absence of a uniquely human psychological trait, i.e. shared intentionality. Human social norms, whether they are universal or cultural, involve moral emotions and are collectivized. We will discuss behaviours in chimpanzees that represent potential evolutionary precursors of human universal social norms, with special focus on social interactions involving infants. We argue that chimpanzee infants occupy a special status within their communities and propose that tolerance towards them might represent a proto social norm. Finally, we discuss possible ways to test this theoretical framework. (shrink)

BackgroundRandomized controlled trials (RCTs) are often complex and expensive to perform. Less than one third achieve planned recruitment targets, follow-up can be labor-intensive, and many have limited real-world generalizability. Designs for RCTs conducted using cohorts and routinely collected health data, including registries, electronic health records, and administrative databases, have been proposed to address these challenges and are being rapidly adopted. These designs, however, are relatively recent innovations, and published RCT reports often do not describe important aspects of their methodology in (...) a standardized way. Our objective is to extend the Consolidated Standards of Reporting Trials (CONSORT) statement with a consensus-driven reporting guideline for RCTs using cohorts and routinely collected health data.MethodsThe development of this CONSORT extension will consist of five phases. Phase 1 (completed) consisted of the project launch, including fundraising, the establishment of a research team, and development of a conceptual framework. In phase 2, a systematic review will be performed to identify publications (1) that describe methods or reporting considerations for RCTs conducted using cohorts and routinely collected health data or (2) that are protocols or report results from such RCTs. An initial “long list” of possible modifications to CONSORT checklist items and possible new items for the reporting guideline will be generated based on the Strengthening the Reporting of Observational Studies in Epidemiology (STROBE) and The REporting of studies Conducted using Observational Routinely-collected health Data (RECORD) statements. Additional possible modifications and new items will be identified based on the results of the systematic review. Phase 3 will consist of a three-round Delphi exercise with methods and content experts to evaluate the “long list” and generate a “short list” of key items. In phase 4, these items will serve as the basis for an in-person consensus meeting to finalize a core set of items to be included in the reporting guideline and checklist. Phase 5 will involve drafting the checklist and elaboration-explanation documents, and dissemination and implementation of the guideline.DiscussionDevelopment of this CONSORT extension will contribute to more transparent reporting of RCTs conducted using cohorts and routinely collected health data. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Byzantinische Zeitschrift Jahrgang: 111 Heft: 3 Seiten: 813-815.

The Journal of the History of Philosophy is saddened to report that Professor Edward P. Mahoney died on January 8, 2009. Professor Mahoney served on the Journal's Board of Directors from 1984 until the spring of 2008, when he retired due to illness. Ed also served on the Journal's Book Review Advisory Board since 1990. He was a tireless advocate of scholarly rigor.Edward Mahoney was born in 1932 in New York City. Ed received his BA at Cathedral College, an MA (...) in Philosophy at St. John's University and an MA in Political Science, and in 1966 a PhD in Philosophy at Columbia University. He wrote his dissertation, The Early Psychology of Augustino Nifo, under the direction of Paul Oskar Kristeller, the noted scholar of medieval and Renaissance thought. Ed went on to become. (shrink)

Distributor statement from label mounted on t.p.

In a crucial paragraph (KrV, A 663-664 / B 691-692) of the first part of the “Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic”, Kant discusses the specific status of the principles of homogeneity, specification, and continuity. In doing so, he refers to an already proven argument and thus to other passages of the Critique of Pure Reason. In search of this argument the “Transcendental Analytic” but in particular the “first book” of the “Transcendental Dialectic” turn out to be possible reference points. Although (...) this contextualisation demands further systematic and editorial reflections, it also allows the clarification of the status of the principles and their justification in relation to a subjective deduction. Kant offers with the subjective deduction, as introduced in the “Preface” (of the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason) and again in the “first book” of the “Transcendental Dialectic”, a first argumentative strategy, which differs from the objective one but provides “some objective validity” (KrV, A 664 / B 692; Kant, 1998, p. 602) and therefore has systematic importance for the principles of homogeneity, specification, and continuity. My aim is to offer immanent strategies for a justification of the principles of homogeneity, specification, and continuity in the framework of the Critique of Pure Reason. (shrink)

The Brentano-Meinong concept of self-presentation is discussed and defined. A property P is said to be self-presenting, i f and only if, P is necessarily such that, for every x, i f x has P and considers the question whether he has P, then it is evident to x that he has P. A definition of the purely psychological is propojsed. Then the following material epistemic principle is discussed and defended: A property P is self-presenting to a person x, i (...) f and only if, P is entailed by a purely psychological property of x. (shrink)

Ausgehend vom Gegensatz ^absolut-relativ' wird im ersten Abschnitt sprachliche Relativität versus Absolutheit anhand von P. Ungers Analyse semantischer Relativität und der Unterscheidung invariantischer und kontextualer Analyse behandelt. Im zweiten Abschnitt wird das Relativismusproblem in bezug auf psychologische (und soziologische) Relativität diskutiert und in der Gruppe der ersteren Wittgenstein, Kripke und Putnam erwähnt und deren Argumente über die Unmöglichkeit privater innerer Gegenstände zur Widerlegung subjektiver Relativität herangezogen. Sodann wird gezeigt, daß das analoge Argument zugunsten eines Relativismus auf soziokulturellem Gebiet auftritt. Rahmenrelativität (...) scheint demnach unvermeidbar. Ein Absolutheitsanspruch des Relativismus selbst bleibt unerfüllbar. (shrink)

This massive, expensive tome comprises all the proceedings of the 1970 biennial meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association. Beyond the selection of the papers to be presented at the meeting, there has been no winnowing of the good from the bad. Further, there is no indexing. Thus, the technical philosopher of science, to whose interest the contributed papers in this anthology will appeal, faces the prospect of doing these jobs himself. The symposium papers, which account for a relatively small (...) fraction of this volume, will interest readers of this journal the most. These papers investigate three topics: theoretical entities in statistical explanation; capacities and natures; history of science and its rational reconstruction. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:196 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY in 1943, was to write an Epilogue to Julian Marias' History o] Philosophy. In early 1944, the Epilogue was conceived as a volume of 400 pages, and later of 700. In 1945 a part of the Epilogue was to be detached and given the title The Origin ol Philosophy. Then one completed part of that was published in 1953 as an essay in a Festschrift (...) for Karl Jaspers. That, and other sections, have been put together here. The first part of the book treats philosophy as a cumulative enterprise in which each man rethinks and thinks further what other men have thought. Even when past thought has reached an end, or taken a direction we will not follow, it is only for the reason that it has already happened that we do not have to do it ourselves. This is not because history is rational but because thought is historical, rooted in ideas we did not ourselves create and based on methods we have acquired and sometimes altered. The second part of the book deals with the origin of philosophy--and the origin of "philosophy" for Ortega is concerned throughout with language and etymology. The word "philosophy" is not one Ortega likes; he prefers the word "aletheia," which was used by Parmenides and his contemporaries. In popular language, aletheia meant discovery, exposure, denudation, revelation. For the thinker, "aletheia" is "truth" as a verb, the activity of uncovering reality, which is concealed under the robes of appearance or falsehood. Philosophy, for Ortega, begins with Parmenides and Heraclitus; "proto-philosophers" he calls them. The Ionians had been scientists; their attempts at natural explanation upset religion and tradition, and prepared the way for philosophy. In a remarkably subtle and complex analysis for so short a space, Ortega argues that skepticism, atheism, wealth, and knowledge of nature created a freedom based on a need to create or choose one's own beliefs in a world in which relative abundance demands choice, since in poverty "an individual is never in the position of being able to choose; for choice assumes that the circle of one's possibilities is notably greater than that of one's needs" (p. 98). The social need to define the thinker and so grant him professional status that might minimize the hostility of the tradition-ridden and reactionary populace, especially in Athens, led to the name "sophist," which became disreputable to a hostile citizenry, and then to "philosopher." Socrates was, unfortunately, the only philosopher, the man who liked, had a taste for, or loved wisdom, but made no pretense that he had any, saying only he sought it. But the name persisted, and helped institutionalize the new profession. I haven't even intimated the delight of Ortega's incidental insights. He was probably justified in believing that his stature as a thinker was much greater than his reputation. A first-rate, full-scale study of Ortega in English would help, but what we need most is a collection and translation of his complete works. RSLPH ROSS ~cripps College Discourse on Thinking. By Martin Heidegger. Translated by John M. Anderson and E. Hans Freund. (New York: Harper and Row, 1966. Pp. 93. $3.50.) This is a translation of a speech and conversation originally published under the thematic title Gelassenheit (Pfullingen: Giinther Neske, 1959). Heidegger uses this unusual German word to remind us that there is another way of thinking than the calculative and dialectical modes made prominent by the mathematical sciences and modem cultural philosophy respectively. We have forgotten a less busy mode of thinking, a thinking released from all desire to control reality. Gelassenheit is rendered throughout as "releasement" in this translation. But Gelassenheit does not just mean letting go, or freedom from, as "releasement" may suggest. It also has the more positive sense of composure and a patient letting things be. In the context of Heidegger's attempts to define a mode of thinking not concerned with dominating reality, Gelassenheit comes to mean the freedom to be open to reality. BOOK REVIEWS 197 Heidegger stresses the ability to wait for insight, which is not, however, a mere passive waiting for something fixed. It would be... (shrink)

It can be said that Formal Logic begun by studying an idealization of the statements ’if p, then q’, something coming from long ago in both Greek and Scholastic Philosophy. Nevertheless, only in the XX Century it arrived at a stage of formalization once in 1910 Russell introduced and identified the ’material conditional’ with the expresion ”not p or q”. In 1918, and from paradoxical conditionals like ”If the Moon is a cheese, it is a Lyon’s face”, Lewis critiziced the (...) material conditional and introduced the so-called ’strict conditional’ as the modal necessity of the material one. In 1934, Huntington proved that both material and strict implications are coincidental in the setting of Boolean algebras and, hence, that they only can be actually different in algebraic structures weaker than Boolean algebras. Boolean algebras have too much laws for supporting the difference of both conditionals. This paper is nothing else than an algebraic trial to find simple binary Boolean operations able to express Lewis’ strict implication, and contains a new and simpler proof than that of Huntington, made by identifying ’possible’ with ’non self-contradictory’. By the way, it is shown that this proof is only valid in Boolean algebras, but neither in proper De Morgan algebras, nor in proper Ortholattices, with which it still remains open where the two conditional relations are actually different. (shrink)

Brecht, A. The incompatibility of liberty and equality.--Possony, S. T. The procedural constitution.--Pelinka, A. Der unechte Parlamentarismus in Frankreich und Österreich.--Schambeck, H. Die Stellung der politischen Parteien nach österreichischem Verfassungsrecht.--Dunner, J. Democratic theory and civil disobedience.--Schäfer, F. Die Ausschussberatung im Deutschen Bundestag.--Willms, G. Miszellen aus der Gefangenschaft.--Kaase, M. Strukturen politischer Beteiligung.--Merkl, P. H. Party members and society in West Germany and Italy.--Kaltefleiter, W. Politische Form.--Zellentin, G. Konferenzdiplomatie und friedlicher Wandel in Europa.--Kammler, H. Kapitalistische Expansion und Exportmonopolismus.--Wildenmann, R. Wahlsysteme und Demokratie.

Educators studied are: Francis Parker, John Dewey, Rudolf Steiner, Hugh Mearns, and Laura Zirbes.

The form of nominalism known as 'mathematical fictionalism' is examined and found wanting, mainly on grounds that go back to an early antinominalist work of Rudolf Carnap that has unfortunately not been paid sufficient attention by more recent writers.